sehepunkte 26 (2026), Nr. 10

Renske (K.P.S.) Janssen: Marginalized Religion and the Law in the Roman Empire

Renske Janssen's goal in this lucid and meticulous book is to provide a study of "the legal treatment of marginalized religious groups" (3) in the Roman Empire. She focuses on three groups: diviners, Jews, and Christians. As she notes, much has been written about all three, but most of that work has treated each in isolation. In bringing them together in a comparative study, Janssen "hopes to shed a new light on the religious landscape of the Roman world by systematically analysing the way in which these marginalized groups were embedded in, and interacted with, the Roman legal system of the imperial period" (4).

Her case studies are well chosen, since in all three cases there is a relative abundance of source material. She does not limit herself to legal enactments in the strict sense, but also includes evidence for trials and police actions such as expulsions. In all cases she analyzes the evidence in its wider social and historical context, paying attention to the origins and implementation of each measure as well as its specific content. Although it would have been interesting to add "magic" to the mix, the theoretical and methodological issues involved are so complex that she was wise to avoid it. The chronological range of her study is largely determined by her choice of topics, since the bulk of the relevant material dates to the imperial period. Her cut-off date is the mid-third century CE, another sensible choice, since as she notes that century saw a number of significant changes.

The structure of the book is very neat and makes it easy to follow her argument. After a brief Introduction that sets out her approach, goals, and methodology, she provides in Chapter 1 a succinct and well-informed overview of Roman legal and administrative practice. She does an excellent job of synthesizing and digesting a wide range of work into a clear and balanced summary of key points, emphasizing above all the flexible, negotiated, and ad hoc nature of most Roman legal and institutional policy, especially in the provinces.

Three main chapters, one each on divination, Judaism, and Christianity, constitute the core of the book. Each has the same structure: after a brief introduction, there are sections on 'terminology and definitions' and 'outline and central questions' and then a chronological review of all the relevant evidence, organized by the date of the legal action; a brief conclusion summarizes the main findings. A concluding chapter is followed by three appendices, which set out in tabular form the evidence that she analyzes in the main chapters. The book ends with an extensive bibliography and a detailed index.

One of the great strengths of the book is her careful analysis of individual legal actions, which is impossible to summarize here. Instead, I will note just a few key points. In Chapter 2, on divination, Janssen makes a strong case that the tendency in earlier scholarship to focus on astrology was misguided, and that the sources typically include a whole range of terms for diviners (50-55). She also critiques the widespread assumption that a measure attributed by Cassius Dio to Augustus was the basis of a comprehensive law regulating the consultation of diviners (67-72). She argues that the evidence instead highlights a recurring concern with treason and the disruption of public order, and "makes it difficult to establish a singular legal basis for measures against divination" (120).

In her treatment of Judaism in Chapter 3, Janssen similarly rejects the hypothesis that there was any legal enactment, apart from the imposition of the Jewish tax in the wake of the Jewish War of 66-70 CE, that affected Jews throughout the empire. She instead emphasizes the local and ad hoc nature of most measures, which came about when Roman authorities responded to localized conflicts between Jewish communities and their non-Jewish neighbors. Non-Jews were motivated primarily by a sense that Jews did not fully belong to their community, while Jews made as much use as possible of precedents to argue for Roman support.

Chapter 4 takes a similar approach to the legal status of Christianity. The trials of Christians did not result from any systematic Roman legislation, but instead emerged from local tensions and took place within the legal framework of the cognition procedure. The enactments of Roman emperors were likewise rescripts specific to particular times and places and not universal edicts. The charge was generally that of "being a Christian," although accusations of criminal activity, political disloyalty, and religious deviance must have played an important part in shaping people's attitudes towards Christians.

In the short concluding chapter, Janssen highlights the patterns that occur across all three groups. As will at this point come as no surprise, she stresses that "legal measures dealing with these groups were overwhelmingly local in nature, as well as of limited duration" (318); they were ad hoc rather than systematic, and the impetus for them generally came not from Roman officials but from local populations. The underlying issue common to all three cases was "the idea that certain groups fell outside the accepted societal boundaries of the Graeco-Roman world and therefore did not 'belong'" (322).

Janssen's conclusions are persuasive and well-grounded in her detailed and precise examination of the evidence, but her emphasis on the commonalities in her case studies invites further reflection on their differences. Were these three religious groups "religious" in the same way, and "groups" in the same way? Although she raises the former question several times, she does not really come to terms with the methodological problems involved in using "religion" as a conceptual category in the analysis of ancient Mediterranean society and culture, and she does not raise the latter question at all. As she acknowledges in the conclusion (324-325), to the extent that diviners constituted a group at all, it was through their common engagement with certain practices. It was these practices, it seems, and not the group defined by them, that was the real focus of the legal measures she examines. The legal treatment of Christians, in sharp contrast, seems most often to have hinged not on practices but on identity, "being a Christian." The crucial factor was apparently the willingness of particular individuals to self-identify as members of a group that had come to be regarded as punishable. To the extent that practices were relevant, it was because both accusers and accused generally agreed that those who identified themselves as Christians refused to engage in certain practices; those who denied the identity might then be required to prove their denial by engaging in those practices. We can perhaps conceptualize Jews as falling somewhere between the two ends of this spectrum. To a greater extent than Christians, their group identity was defined by certain practices (circumcision for men, avoidance of pork, support of the Jerusalem temple); even when someone disclaimed the identity, they might still be regarded as Jews on the evidence of their practices.

These distinctions are of course a gross over-simplification; I offer them here merely to suggest there is further analytical work to be done in pursuit of Janssen's comparative project. In the meantime, we are fortunate that she has provided us with such an excellent foundation for future research.